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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology*; *Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*; *Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics*; *Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien*; *Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique*; *R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia*; *V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*; *Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*; *Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*; *Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*; *Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*; *Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL.

The Hegelian Point of View. J. S. MACKENZIE. Mind, No. 41, pp. 54–71.

At any time there is a point of view, determined by the position of thought in general, from which one must approach philosophical questions in order to secure the best results. At the present time that view may, in a broad sense, be described as Hegelian. A philosophical system is the construction of an individual; while a point of view belongs rather to an age. In Germany, Hegel's comprehensive system has taken root as a whole. In England, however, attention is given more to its spirit and meaning than to details. Bosanquet has pointed out that German idealism differs from characteristic English thought, not by its attitude toward experience, but in its emphasis on the reality of the universal. With Hegel, as with Spinoza and Kant, the method is not the most important contribution. His chief significance is not dialectic, but the emphasis that he lays on th concreteness of the true universal. Kant brings out the importance of the universal, but makes it largely formal. The intellectual element of experience deals with a material to which it has no true relation. Hegel seeks to arrive at principles which emerge from the material itself. His view is misconceived if regarded as merely formal or merely empirical. In epistemology, Hegel completes the work of Kant by denying the ultimate opposition of thought and sense. Thought is analytic as well as synthetic. Sense is not annulled, but it involves universal determinations which must be interpreted in the light of thought. A view which recognizes that philosophy is experience completely interpreted stands in a sympathetic relation to the particular sciences. In psychology, we find that the latest results of Ward and Stout are Hegelian in character. Hegel does not oppose genuine progress; but with keen historical insight he avoids reforms of a revolutionary nature. While utilitarianism and intuitionism appeal to the particular, and the categorical imperative represents the abstract universal, Hegel seeks to show that 'morality is in the nature of things,' and also

to show the meaning of the process of development. In politics, the Hegelian point of view gives due weight both to individualism and to socialism. It is sometimes said that Hegel reduces everything to thought; the truth is, that he does not emphasize thought as opposed to feeling and will, but thought as the conscious grasp of the universal.

N. E. TRUMAN.

The Insufficiency of Materialism. G. S. FULLERTON. Psych. Rev., IX, 2, pp. 156–173.

Materialism, both ancient and modern, in maintaining that nothing exists save atoms and void space, leaves out of account sensations, memories, and thought-processes with which the psychologist deals. The world as a mechanism does not admit of many things, such as color and sound, plainly found in our experience. It takes cognizance of Locke's primary qualities of matter, and that is all. To identify sound and color with 'secretions,' or with the waste products of the brain in its functioning, is to deny them their own proper nature and confound them with something else. Again, to say that thought is a 'function' of the brain, reduces sound and color to a particular clash of atoms, and this is contrary to experience. In the present state of the sciences it is inexcusable to overlook the existence of all save the Democritean atoms and their motions.

C. M. STORY.

Les problèmes philosophique et leur solution dans l'histoire. D'après les principes du néocriticisme. L. DAURIAC. Rev. Ph., XXVII, 4, pp. 345–360.

The originality of a philosopher may exhibit itself in two ways. First, by his manner of propounding and resolving problems; and, second, by his manner of conceiving and judging the doctrines of philosophy in their historic development. With regard to the second point, philosophic doctrines, regarded historically, may be considered as continuous developments, a point of view represented by Hegel's history of philosophy, and by the four books of the metaphysic of Aristotle. In this case, the history of philosophy will be divided into great epochs. Or, on the other hand, it may be held that the systems of philosophy do not follow one another, but only succeed. In this case, they will be divided into classes, after the manner of living forms, as different and antagonistic species. This latter view is represented by Ch. Renouvier. The purpose of the other, is, apparently, to review Renouvier's treatment of the problems of philosophy from this latter point of view, which represents the standpoint of neocriticism. "Neocriticism is from the very first a system 'of the relativity of the real.'" Supposing that this relativity is proved, what results flow from it? There are five dilemmas: (1) Relation or phenomenon; (1) substance or law of phenomena; (3) the finite or the infinite; (4) freedom or necessity; (5) God or man. H. C. STEVENS.

Kantisme et Néo-Scolastique. M. DE WULF. Revue Néo-Scolastique, IX, 1, pp. 5–18.

This article is a reply to Eucken, *Thomas von Aquino und Kant: Ein Kampf zweier Welten*[1] in *Kantstudien*, 1901. Eucken is wrong in saying that the Neo-Thomists do not understand the universal and objective characteristics of the Kantian philosophy. He makes them attribute an absolute value to Aristotelianism and Thomism, and identifies the two systems without recognizing the important theological, psychological, and moral theories which separate Thomas of Aquino from the Stagirite. The truth is that inadequate views are unpityingly set aside by those who investigate Scholasticism not for itself but for the truth which it contains; *e. g.* Nys in his work on chemistry. Kant, as well as Leibniz, St. Thomas, and Aristotle, will have his epoch. Extreme evolution is a false hypothesis. History shows that there is adaptation to environment, and that every age has its problems and aspirations; but there are also eternal repetitions, rhythmic oscillations in thought. The distinction of noumenon and phenomenon is found in the vedic hymns. Beyond change there is a spirit of truth in all systems. It is this that Neo-Thomism believes it has found in some fundamental doctrines of Aristotle and St. Thomas. Eucken does not understand Scholasticism when he makes philosophy merely an aid to theology. Such a relation existed, but that does not exhaust the fact. Scholastic philosophy independently investigated the reasons of the universal order. And this characteristic constitutes its interest for Neo-Scholasticism. N. E. TRUMAN.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

Psychology and History. GUIDO VILLA. Monist, XII, 2, pp. 215–235.

The diversity of methods and the relatively slow progress in psychology are due to its wide field of research. To remedy the defects of the old introspective method, psychology is attempting to apply physiological experimentation. Social psychology is brought forward as a second great method. Then we have child psychology, animal psychology, and pathological psychology. There is a relative agreement among experimental psychologists in respect to certain methods of research, but a wide divergence concerning the aims and limits of their science. The limits of social psychology are even more indefinite. An organic science can only be established by a union of the various methods. What is the final scope towards which these various methods ought to converge? Psychology must be more than the experimental examination of the elementary processes of knowledge. It must be the study of the mind in all its manifestations, not only in the individual but in history. Psychology is fundamental to the moral disciplines. The historical method has helped the moral studies to make more exact researches. But it has given more attention to the description and exposition of facts than to their explanation. Now that

[1] For a summary of Eucken's article see this journal, Vol. XI, pp. 91–92.

the historical method is supplemented by the psychological method, history can give a true explanation of its facts. For some years there has been an attempt to build up a general system of the sciences on the basis of new criteria. In this system, all the sciences that can be reduced to general abstract principles would be natural sciences. The concept, history, would embrace all the sciences limited to the establishment of a succession of facts whether natural or moral. These philosophers establish a profound difference between psychology and history. Psychology would be an abstract natural science, while history would deal only with the concrete individual facts. This classification is arbitrary. Physiological phenomena are reducible to the general laws of physical energy, but the phenomena of psychology are qualitative processes not transferable into quantitative equivalents. All psychic processes have the concrete individual character of historical facts. The investigation and confirmation of facts is the indispensable means to every historical reconstruction; but the final end is the explanation of the facts themselves. This explanation can come only through application of the general principles of psychology. Society is formed by individuals, but it must be remembered that the individual is the result of society. If the psychological evolution of the species is considered as a progressive unfolding, whose laws must coincide with those of the individual's consciousness, we may hope to arrive at a scientific explanation of historical events. There ought to be a perfect parallelism between the simplest psychic processes, which can be studied experimentally, and the historical phenomena which cannot be so studied. The union of individual psychology and history must be brought about by social psychology. Social psychology ought to be to history precisely what individual psychology is to the individual. G. W. T. WHITNEY.

L'effort intellectuel. H. BERGSON. Rev. Ph., XXVII, 1, pp. 1–27.

The object of this paper is to show that the reduction of intellectual effort to a play between schemas and images conforms most closely to what is revealed by introspection (*observation intérieure*), and that it is at the same time the simplest psychological explanation. Beginning with memory or recollection, the writer finds that the essence of the effort of memory appears to be the developing of a schema, if not simple, at least concentrated, into an image with elements distinct and more or less independent of each other. When we let our memory wander at random, and without effort, images succeed images, all homogeneous, and lying in the same plane of consciousness. When, on the contrary, we make an effort to remember, we begin a progressive descent from a higher stage towards the image to be evoked. In the first case, the movement is horizontal, in the second, vertical. The images in the first movement are homogeneous, but represent different objects; in the second, a single object is represented throughout the whole operation, but the intellectual states are heterogeneous, sometimes schemas, sometimes images, the schema tending towards

the images in proportion as the movement of descent is accentuated. It may be concluded, therefore, that the effort of recollection consists in converting a schematic representation, the elements of which fuse, into an imaged representation with its parts juxtaposed. Passing to intellectual effort in general, we find that it is a movement of a dynamic schema in the direction of the image which develops it. It is a continuous transformation of abstract relations, suggested by the objects perceived, into concrete images. The feeling of effort arises on the passage from schema to image. Similarly with the highest form of intellectual effort, the effort of invention, which consists in conducting a single representation across different planes of consciousness from the abstract to the concrete, from schema to image. This conception of mental effort accounts for the principal effects of intellectual labor, and is, at the same time, the closest approach to a simple statement of fact. M. S. MACDONALD.

Die Gerüche vom psychogenetischen Standpunkte aus. C. M. GIESSLER. V. f. w. Ph., XXVI, 1, pp. 49–76.

The psychogenetic significance of the sense of smell is more marked in the animal world than in human life. In the former case, olfactory sensations stand in the closest relation to impulse, and often produce a high degree of excitement. The psychical processes which accompany impulse in the higher animals can be determined from the analogy of human consciousness. This method fails us in the study of insects. Their grade of mental life is not yet made out; but observations show that bees and ants have instinctive consciousness rather than purposive activity without consciousness of purpose. The sense of smell is of great assistance in the development of the gregarious impulse; for by this means one bee recognizes another as friend or stranger. Since nearly all ants are blind, smell is much more important than sight for the perception of distant objects. And consciousness is more intense and continuous because impulses are aroused by olfactory stimulation. In case of the higher animals, smell completes mental functions which are already developed. In the dog, it strengthens the attention, and thus produces greater continuity of consciousness; it aids impressions derived from the other senses, and is persistent enough to appear in instinctive associations. A capacity for fine distinction of smells is the condition of the dog's great teachableness, and is an influence favoring the development of his lively imagination. With the dog, the gregarious instinct develops to altruism; and love is more intense because it receives its effective color by means of olfactory sensations. In human consciousness, odors are noticed which are neither attractive nor repellant, but merely serve to identify objects. Analysis is more exact; synthesis is freer. And attention to the result modifies the effective value. The sense of smell increases the plasticity of visual representations. Experiment proves that particular odors tend to facilitate definite ideas, and to condition the abstracting and determining activity of the imagination.

This correspondence is clear in the case of the æsthetic, ethical, and logical emotions. Certain odors, *e. g.*, rose, violet, and lilac, suggest thoughts of the beautiful. The lily, iris, and hyacinth lead to feelings of worth and nobility. Tobacco, coffee, and ozone induce a desire for clearness of representation. These three classes of odors are idealistic; while those that produce mental depression are termed realistic. N. E. TRUMAN.

The Psychological Necessity of Religion. STEPHEN S. COLVIN. Am. J. Ps., XIII, 1, pp. 80–87.

Two views are held at the present day with regard to the future of religion: first, religion is approaching annihilation, and speculative thinking and practical ethics will be substituted for it; second, the religious consciousness is something fundamental and implicit. To ascertain the truth we must examine the essential nature of religion to see whether there is any psychological necessity for its existence. Schleiermacher's definition of religion as the feeling of absolute dependence is right, but with the limitations that there is implied also knowledge as to the proper relation which the individual shall sustain to the power without, and also will which seeks to realize that relation. This definition accords with what is known about the origin and growth of religions. True religion is born in pessimism. The feeling of absolute dependence is the essential feature of the great historical religions past and present; and man, as he is, can never free himself from this feeling. Religion, in the sense defined, can never be transcended or eliminated, for two reasons: first, because absolute knowledge and perfect intelligence are impossible; second, because life in itself is not satisfactory and never can be. C. M. STORY.

Der psychische Zusammenhang bei Münsterberg. JONAS COHN. V. f. w. Ph., XXVI, 1, pp. 1–20.

The purpose of this paper is to raise a question with reference to Münsterberg's psychology; to present Münsterberg's standpoint with reference to the question; and finally, to consider this standpoint critically. The question is, how Münsterberg himself conceives the end of psychology, the construction of a psychical coherence. The two propositions which are pertinent to the critique are: "All causal coherence rests on the idenity of the object; all logical coherence on the identity of the subjective act." With regard to the second proposition, Münsterberg's position is that causality cannot be ascribed to consciousness, since identity is excluded from it. Cohn replies that there is more than *one* such consciousness—using what is psychologically coherent and consciousness as convertible terms—and by that fact is distinguished from the objective coherence of physics. That this is true is an original fact which can neither be further defined nor derived. With regard to the first proposition, Münsterberg's argument is that causality means necessary connection; necessity becomes causality when it is reconducted to identity by means of causal equations.

Such reconduction to identity is not possible in psychology since it deals with qualities. Cohn attacks the thesis that causality rests on identity. His arguments are: First, it is not possible in mechanics to represent causality by an absolutely identical equation; secondly, the special content of every causal law contains empirical factors, and consequently is only highly probable. H. C. STEVENS.

ETHICAL.

The Commensurability of All Values. H. RASHDALL. Mind, No., 42, pp. 145–161.

What principle governs our choice between the different kinds of good? Nothing can be right or wrong except in so far as it tends to produce a good. When we have to choose between goods, it is always right to choose the greater good. Such a doctrine implies that goods of all kinds can be compared, that we can place goods of all kinds on a single scale, and assign to each its value relatively to the rest. No amount of one kind of good can compensate for the absence of all the other kinds of good. But when circumstances make it impossible to secure all these kinds of good, then the decision has to be made in regard to which is best worth having. The choice between them implies that they are commensurable. If we were not capable of distinguishing between various elements of human life, all thinking or talking about the moral ideal, or indeed about practical aims or objects of any kind, would be impossible. And if when we have distinguished between them, we are not to say which of them is best, and to act upon our answers, there is an end to the possibility of any ethical system that admits that the morality of an act depends upon the consequences. The only way of escaping the admission that different kinds of good are commensurable would be to assert that it is always right to choose the highest. Such a contention involves all the difficulties of the formalistic ethics of Kant. As a matter of fact, when we appeal to the actual moral judgment of mankind, we do not find that a smaller quantity of a higher good is always pronounced to be of greater worth than a larger quantity of a lower good. The writer brings forward a number of examples to show that in judgments of worth we do actually weigh very heterogeneous goods against one another, and decide which possesses most value, and in making that estimate we do take into consideration the amount of the two kinds of good as well as the quality.

G. W. T. WHITNEY.

A Critique of Kant's Ethics. FELIX ADLER. Mind, No. 42, pp. 162–195.

Kant's entire ethical system depends on the idea of freedom. The starting-point is the fact, real or assumed, of unconditional obligation. The inference from this fact is practical freedom, and practical freedom requires transcendental freedom for its speculative basis. Transcendental

freedom is the pure self-activity of reason, and the idea of freedom belongs to the world of noumena. It has no place in experience. Psychological freedom is a piece of self-deception. The noumenon, or transcendental substance, is "the timeless originator of effects in time," the existence of which can only be assumed. Kant's problem is to show that the freedom assumed is not incompatible with natural causality. The reconciliation between freedom and necessity is based on the following thoughts: (*a*) The objects of nature are only appearances, and therefore there is room for a double law, that of natural causality, and that of causality through freedom; (*b*) since freedom is the tireless originator of effects in time, the cause is noumenal, the effect phenomenal; (*c*) since the law of freedom is a "cosmological idea," it is compatible with the law of mechanical causality. The empirical self is the phenomenon of the noumenal self. If empirical character were completely known, future acts would be predicted, but its essential element, rational cause, can never be known. That the idea of freedom, a noumenon, should have intercourse with the phenomenal world can be reconciled only if we understand Kant's language symbolically, that is, a noumenon is represented with phenomenal attributes. Two kinds of criticism, practical and metaphysical, may be passed on Kant's theory of freedom. From the standpoint of practical criticism he is in a dilemma, since he must either make character a rigid thing and introduce noumenal inflexibility into the empirical will, or he must introduce change into the noumenon itself and thus destroy its noumenal character. The metaphysical criticisms are: First, Kant makes a metaphysical error when he attempts to separate outside of experience the two factors to which the mind is committed, namely, the manifold and the synthetic process. Second, he assumes that cause and effect need not be the same in kind. Extrinsic connection is only true of phenomena. Between phenomena and noumena an intrinsic connection must be shown, and Kant has not done this. Third, he has failed to make the categorical imperative a synthetic process capable of being apprehended by us. Fourth, Kant's conception of morality cannot be connected with the actual world. A moral act is one which has been performed out of respect for the idea of necessity and universality, and it cannot be proven that such an act has ever been performed. Fifth, practical moral commands cannot be derived from Kant's formula. Sixth, the conception of an end-in-itself has not been justified, and cannot be under Kant's system, because he failed to grasp the organic idea from which alone the idea of end or purpose can be derived. Finally, the ethical system set forth is individualistic. The social duties in the strictest sense are left out. Kant's influence on morality is due to the emphasis of the moral law as an imperative, the sublimity of its origin, and the personality of the man himself.

C. M. STORY.

Zum Streit über das Grundproblem der Ethik in der neueren philosophischen Litteratur. AUGUST GALLINGER. Kant-Studien, VI, 4, pp. 353–426.

This article is an elaborate defence of the Kantian ethics. The ethical theories of several of the more recent German writers are considered, in some cases for the purpose of answering objections to Kant's doctrine, and in other cases for the purpose of showing that when these theories are worked out to their logical conclusion they lead to Kant's position. The essential truth of the Kantian ethics is that a will which is in harmony with itself cannot, under the same objective conditions, decide now for, and now against, a certain line of conduct. To will the right, therefore, is to will in such a way that under the same objective conditions one can always make the same volition. This gives us Kant's formula, "Act so that thou canst always will that the maxim of thy action shall be a universal law." The writer attaches especial importance to the words *canst will*. Brentano misinterprets Kant in supposing that his criterion is logical consistency (*canst think*). Though Kant's phraseology sometimes admits of this interpretation, it is nevertheless a mistaken one. Windelband also misunderstands the *canst will*. If we cannot will that the maxim of our action shall be universal law, the ground of this inability, he says, either is a moral one, in which case we have a circle, or is determined by our interest, in which case our real end is our own happiness. To this criticism the writer replies, the *cannot* will means simply that when you consider the matter *from the point of view of* your own interest, you cannot will that every one should act thus; but it does not follow from this that one who decides not to perform the action does so *for the sake of* his own interest.

Simmel's criticism of Kant attempts to show that our esteem for the good intention came originally from good consequences, and that evil intentions would be prized if their results were usually good. In reply, the writer distinguishes between that which is good in itself (the good intention) and that which is good as tending toward the moral end, and assigns to the former alone an unconditioned moral worth.

The ethical theories of Paulsen, Gizycki, and Stern, when we trace their implications and remove their inconsistencies, give us a doctrine not essentially unlike Kant's. Paulsen uses several of his terms in two or three different meanings, and this often obscures the really close relationship between his theory and that of Kant. *E. g.*, he says that an action is good if its tendency is to preserve and increase human welfare. But he uses the word *tendency* in three different senses. (1) To say that a thing has a certain tendency means that it would produce certain effects if it alone determined the result. This definition is not applicable to acts of will; for no action can be the sole determinant of a result. (2) To say that an act of will has a certain tendency means that the will is directed to the realization of some purpose. Thus the act is good if its purpose is the futherance of human welfare.

But since the purpose of every action is to further the welfare of some human being, we have here no criterion of morality. Accordingly, the only satisfactory definition of tendency which Paulsen gives, is (3) that which identifies the tendency of an act with the effects which would be brought about if the willed act became universal. In this we see his approach to the Kantian doctrine. Similarly, Gizycki's eudæmonism may be reduced to Kant's theory. Gizycki declares that the supreme end is the well-being of humanity, but that this well-being is to be understood, not as mere sensuous enjoyment, but as "an enjoyment worthy of humanity." This implies that the ultimate standard is not enjoyment at all. And Gizycki comes still nearer to Kant when he goes on to say that in deciding as to the morality of a proposed action we must consider how we should judge it if another person, similarly situated, acted in this way. Finally, Stern's formula, "Act in accordance with the impulse to preserve the psychical or spiritual in its different manifestations," is really identical with Kant's second formulation of the moral law. The genetic basis which Stern seeks to give his formula has no bearing upon the real problem of ethics. ELLEN BLISS TALBOT.

The Later Ontology of Plato. A. W. BENN. Mind, No. 41, pp. 31–53.

The new Platonic criticism has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the so-called dialectic dialogues were written after the *Republic*, and represent a more advanced stage of reflexion. Further, it has raised the question whether the ideas have an independent and separate existence apart from the sensible appearance in which they are manifest in us. The present article is in support of the view that the ideas do not have this independent and separate existence. In the *Parmenides* the one and the many is used, as Locke uses the laws of identity and contradiction, to destroy the transcendental theory. In the Sophist the ultimate antithesis is found in the fundamental distinctions, Being, Rest, and Motion, the same and the other. The category of Being is left without its original antithesis not-Being, since not-Being is simply otherness. In the *Timæus*, Being or existence (*ἡ οὐσία*) is placed between two extremes, identity and difference, and is held to be a result of their union. This means that the supreme Ideas are not hypostasized essences, but simply abstractions derived from concrete experience, and have no actuality apart from it. The soul, while invisible and intangible, is not an unextended substance. It is a definite area of space, and this space is in continuous motion. Space is an infinite possibility of movement, rather than an infinite aggregate of coexistences. In its pure form it stands for the utmost conceivable amount of difference. The soul is, perhaps, the form of existence in which the elements of identity prevails; body that in which difference prevails. There is no antithetical relation between Rest and Motion. The two are combined in the perfectly uniform revolution of the world on its axis, and of all the other periodic cycles of nature. There is an intimate association between psychic activ-

ity and movement. The soul is identified with the cause of physical motion, with force, or even with motion itself considered as the result of impact and pressure. The great thought is that of identity in difference—a thought affirmed by Heraclitus and Parmenides, and reaffirmed by Kant and Wordsworth. The method of reconciling nature with man is the same as that of Schelling. Mind is identical with its object. The idea of the same is the ruling principle of cosmic being and of human reason alike. The principle of eternal self-identity in the absolute whole is reconciled with the principle of variety, relativity, antagonism, and mutual dependence in its component parts. C. M. STORY.

Zur Entstehung des französischen Positivismus. GEORG MISCH. Zwei Theile. Ar. f. G. d. Ph., XIV, i, pp. 1–39; ii, pp. 156–209.

French positivism originates historically in the writings of D'Alembert and Turgot. A more remote origin is discoverable in the rise of natural science, and Comte constantly cites Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes as the "Lawgivers" of the positive philosophy. In the great mathematico-physical movement of the 18th century, which involves the names of Maupertuis, Clairant, D'Alembert, and in the following generation, Lagrange, Condorcet, Laplace, and Fourier, are traceable the immediate sources of Comte's philosophy. D'Alembert announced his position in the preface to the *Encyclopédie* and in his *Élemens de philosophie* (1759). Turgot, the statesmen and historian, was also a student of physics and mathematics. The whole Enlightenment sought anchorage in mathematico-physical science. The continuity of this naturalistic and positivistic movement is readily traceable from the Enlightenment to Comte. To establish this continuity is the object of Misch's articles. D'Alembert's contribution to the movement consists in the fact that he constructed a system of the sciences, on the basis of the exclusive validity of natural science, and in the spirit of positivism; while Turgot in his sketches of a universal history laid the basis of the positivistic view of human institutions and development. D'Alembert's system of the sciences, on the one hand, and Turgot's philosophy of history, on the other, are the two main sources of the *cours de philosophie positive*. The former rests on a sensualistic psychology, the 18th century interpretation of Locke's empiricism in France, and is dominated by an anti-metaphysical bias. We know nothing of the essential nature of things. The nature of the soul and its relation to the body, the existence of God, and similar questions are not legitimate problems of science. Reality is ascribed only to the phenomenal world. The possibility of science is given in the uniformity of relations in the phenomenal world. The *Encyclopédie* carries forward the Baconian movement. As the domain of science is confined to natural phenomena, so the end of science is utility. Its business is to satisfy our needs, not our curiosity, as Turgot says. Our senses are given to interpret the relations of things to us, not what is the nature of these things in themselves—the latter is matter for mere scholastic

subtlety. The natural scientist assumes the existence of an outer world, regardless of its metaphysical and epistemological implications, just as every man is obliged to do in actual conduct. Here the conclusions of instinct are safer than the deductions of metaphysic. Substance and causality are empty concepts; we do not know any explanatory 'how' or 'why' in the energy of phenomena; science is merely a descriptive system of observed tranformations. In these positions of D'Alembert and Turgot is given the anti-metaphysical standpoint of positivism. Further, D'Alembert in his *Élemens* sketched an outline of the sciences, in which he endeavored, in the spirit of algebra (which is essentially a form of logic wherein the unknown is derived from the formula of the known), to exhibit the structure of scientific reality. Turgot in the same positivistic spirit attempted to interpret the historical world; he makes physical and terrestrial configuration and natural forces the starting point in his explanation of political geography, and the entire content of intellectual and social culture is developed stage by stage from palpable or natural forces. Positivism came to conscious formulation in the phenomenalistic, anti-metaphysical methods of D'Alembert and Turgot (the latter frequently uses the term *positive* to describe his method)—a method that turned away from the investigation of the ultimate nature of causes and confined itself to logico-mathematical relations. The historical connection between positivism and the above-mentioned influences is further shown by the personal relations which maintained this continuity: D'Alembert and Turgot were both intimately associated, as teachers or co-workers, with Lagrange and Condorcet, and Comte himself calls Condorcet his spiritual father. A further channel for the passage of this influence was given in Saint-Simon and the *École polytechnique*, where Comte received his best training, and the soul of which was Lagrange. A further vital factor in this movement was the foundation (1795) in the Institute of France of the Section of *Sciences morales et politiques*. W. A. H.